Abstract Under the standard summation technology, pure public goods can be provided via the direct contributions mechanism, even in an arbitrarily large group. However, if the public good exhibits any degree of rivalry, individual consumption of the public good will fall to zero as group size grows large. Thus, the direct contributions mechanism is not robust to the introduction of rivalry. By contrast, Morgan's (Review of Economic Studies 67:761-784, 2000) lottery mechanism is robust to the introduction of rivalry when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. The lottery mechanism can provide public goods in a large group when the public good exhibits a degree of rivalry, provided that the degree of rivalry is not too high. This suggests that the lottery mechanism can provide a broader range of public goods in a large group than the direct contributions mechanism.
Introduction
Morgan (2000) has shown that provision of a pure public good is greater under the lottery mechanism than under the direct contributions mechanism. Moreover, under the lottery mechanism, provision is increasing in group size. However, Pecorino and Temimi (2007) consider fully rival public goods, and while they find that the lottery mechanism continues to outperform the direct contributions mechanism, under both P. Pecorino ( ) · A. Temimi Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Box 870224, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0224, USA e-mail: ppecorin@cba.ua.edu mechanisms, individual consumption of the public good goes to 0 in a large group. 1 While Pecorino and Temimi consider the extreme cases of a pure public good and a fully rival public good, they do not consider cases with intermediate degrees of rivalry. These intermediate cases are important because if, for example, the introduction of even a small degree of rivalry causes a mechanism to fail in a large group, then it suggests a rather limited scope for the mechanism's usefulness. Indeed, for the voluntary contributions mechanism, the introduction of a small degree of rivalry implies that consumption of the public good will fall to 0 in a large group. By contrast, the lottery mechanism continues to perform well in large groups, as long as the lottery prize increases in proportion to group size and the degree of rivalry of the public good is not too high. The robustness of the lottery mechanism with respect to the introduction of rivalry suggests a potentially large range of public goods for which the mechanism might be effective.
Much work on public goods has focused on the case of pure public goods, but the works of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) indicate that publically provided goods exhibit a great deal of rivalry. 2 Esteban and Ray (2001) consider partially rival goods in their analysis, and note (p. 664) that many goods provided by the government exhibit a high degree of rivalry. Thus, in assessing the overall usefulness of the lottery mechanism, it is useful to see how well it performs when a degree of rivalry is introduced.
The model
We will first establish that the voluntary contributions mechanism is not robust to rivalry in the sense that introducing a small degree of rivalry will guarantee that individual consumption of the public good will fall to zero as group size grows large. The exposition of the model follows Pecorino and Temimi (2007) fairly closely and this work in turn draws on Morgan (2000) . The key difference with these earlier works is that we will allow the public good to exhibit intermediate degrees of rivalry.
The voluntary contributions mechanism
There are n identical consumers with utility given by
where w denotes the wealth of the consumer, h(g) reflects utility derived from the public good, x i is person i's contribution to the public good and g i is the individual consumption of the public good. Since the public good is nonexcludable, we will write g i = g throughout. We assume that h (·) > 0, and h (·) < 0, so that h(g) is
